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THE FEDERALISM OF CLIMEX 
LECTULARIUS: WHAT BED-BUGS TELL 
US ABOUT FIFRA PREEMPTION IN 
PESTICIDE APPLICATOR CASES 
 
DAVID BEUGELMANS* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
During July 2010, a New Jersey exterminator sprayed seventy 
residences – including mattresses and toys – with malation and carbaryl to 
combat Climex lectularius, otherwise known as bed bugs.1 Both pesticides 
are absorbed by the skin and are dangerous at high concentrations.2 During 
October 2010, an exterminator hired to eradicate bed bugs in a New York 
City elementary school left pesticides puddled “on the teachers’ desks, on 
the children’s desks, on their books, [and] on the floor,” with cleanup costs 
of more than $200,000.3 Despite such close calls, state authorities clamored 
for EPA exemptions4 of non-indoor use pesticides to combat the bed bug 
 
Copyright © 2011 by David Beugelmans. 
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of Maryland School of Law (Baltimore, MD); B.A., Politics, 
2009, University of California, Santa Cruz (Santa Cruz, CA).  
 1. Judy Peet, DEP Orders Exterminator to Clean Up Toxic Residue, THE STAR-LEDGER, 
July 13, 2010 at 9. 
 2. Id.; see also Malathion for Mosquito Control, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/opp00001/health/mosquitoes/malathion4mosquitoes.htm (last updated July 7, 
2008) (“[A]t high doses, malathion, like other organophosphates, can over-stimulate the nervous 
system causing nausea, dizziness, or confusion. Severe high-dose poisoning with any 
organophosphate can cause convulsions, respiratory paralysis, and death.”); Amended 
Reregistration Eligibility Decision (RED) for Carbaryl, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 9 (Aug. 2008),  
available at http://www.epa.gov/oppsrrd1/reregistration/REDs/carbaryl-red-amended.pdf 
(“[C]arbaryl is currently classified as . . . ‘likely to be carcinogenic to humans.’”). 
 3. Art McFarland, Bed bug ridding chemicals contaminate school, WABC, Oct. 26, 2010, 
http://abclocal.go.com/wabc/story?section=news/local&id=7748002. 
 4. Matt Leingang, US Grapples With Bedbugs, Misuse of Pesticides, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Aug. 30, 2010, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100831/ap_on_re_us/us_bedbug_conundrum. 
Recently, Governor Strickland of Ohio pleaded with EPA to issue an emergency exemption for 
home use of propoxur, a pesticide the agency has banned from home use and considers a probably 
carcinogen. Id. EPA Administrator Jackson denied his request. Id. 
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epidemic.5 Justified or not, the pandemonium of the 2010 bed bug epidemic 
exemplifies how hazardous pesticides may come into contact with 
unknowing individuals. The potential for harm also raises the question how 
the Federal Insecticide, Rodenticide and Fungicide Act (“FIFRA”)6 may 
preempt claims against negligent pesticide applicators. 
FIFRA includes express preemption language regarding state labeling 
requirements.7 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences Inc.8 clarified this preemption 
language in manufacturer cases.9 After Bates, courts cannot impose a 
blanket preemption regime where all claims invoking FIFRA labeling 
requirements are automatically preempted.10 In this settled landscape, 
however, one area of uncertainty remains: FIFRA preemption of claims 
against pesticide applicators.11 Courts have relied on wildly divergent 
rational, leaving them divided on how claims against applicators implicate 
FIFRA labeling requirements.12 Under the Bates preemption regime, these 
divergent theories operate in even more contradictory ways; some theories 
preempt all claims against applicators,13 while others preempt no claims 
against applicators.14 Only one court applies Bates directly to applicator 
cases, preempting claims that impose additional or different labeling 
requirements on EPA approved labeling.15 
This article begins by summarizing FIFRA provisions and EPA 
regulations relevant to common law claims against applicators, including 
pesticide labeling requirements16 and pesticide applicator certification 
guidelines.17 Generally, courts have given only cursory attention to these 
requirements in applicator cases,18 yet they provide valuable insight as to 
FIFRA’s preemptory effect.19 This article then briefly recounts the 
 
 5. For a summary and statistics of the epidemic, see id.; see also America's bedbug invasion: 
By the numbers, THE WEEK, July 26, 2010, http://theweek.com/article/index/205392/americas-
bedbug-invasion-by-the-numbers. 
 6. Federal Insecticide, Rodenticide, and Fungicide Act, 7 U.S.C. 136 (2006); 61 Stat. 163 § 
1 (1947) (“This Act may be cited as the “Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act.”). 
 7. 7 U.S.C. 136v(b) (2006). 
 8. 544 U.S. 431 (2005). 
 9. See infra SECTION III.C. 
 10. See infra SECTION III.C. 
 11. See infra SECTION IV. 
 12. See infra SECTION IV. 
 13. See infra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra SECTION IV.A.1. 
 15. See infra notes 167–89 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra SECTION I.A. 
 17. See infra SECTION I.B. 
 18. See infra SECTION IV (discussing how courts have addressed this issue, almost none of 
which discussed EPA regulations). 
 19. See infra SECTION V.A (discussing how Bates interacts with EPA regulations).  
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preemption doctrine,20 before proceeding with an extensive analysis of 
Supreme Court decisions interpreting FIFRA preemption.21 It then analyzes 
cases from the state and federal levels that apply the FIFRA preemption 
regime to common law claims against applicators.22 This section organizes 
disparate decisions into the select modes of preemption, breaking analysis 
first into express23 and implied24 preemption, and then into relevant 
subparts. This article ends by concluding that the majority of courts fail to 
consider a key element in the FIFRA regulatory scheme: EPA regulations 
themselves.25 This analysis suggests FIFRA does preempt many common 
law claims against applicators.26 While this is a proper extension of 
administrative expertise, EPA should take additional precautions to guard 
against unwarranted preemption of claims against applicators.27 
I.  FIFRA, EPA, AND STATE REQUIREMENTS ON PESTICIDE LABELING 
AND APPLICATORS 
A.  Pesticide Label Requirements 
To sell pesticides in the United States, manufacturers must comply 
with FIFRA registration standards.28 Once approved, pesticide 
manufactures must comply with EPA-imposed labeling requirements.29 
Noncompliance is “unlawful.”30 Pertinent to the preemption debate, states 
may not “impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or 
packaging in addition to or different from those required” under the 
statute.31 Also, it is unlawful “to use any registered pesticide in a manner 
inconsistent with its labeling.”32 
 
 20. See infra SECTION II. 
 21. See infra SECTION III. 
 22. See infra SECTION IV. 
 23. See infra SECTION IV.A. 
 24. See infra SECTION IV.B. 
 25. See infra SECTION V. 
 26. See infra SECTION V. 
 27. See infra SECTION V. 
 28. 7 U.S.C. § 136a (2006) (providing registration requirements for pesticide manufactures, 
including submission of pesticide contents and proposed labeling); see also Ian M. Hughes, 
Comment, Does FIFRA Level State Tort Claims for Inadequate Warning “Preempted?” Welcher 
v. American Cyanamid, Inc., 7 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 313, 316–17 (1996) (explaining various 
registration procedures). 
 29. 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(1)(E) (2006) (making it illegal to distribute or sell “any pesticide 
which is adulterated or misbranded”); §136(q)(1)(E) (defining misbranding as, in part, “any word, 
statement, or other information required by or under authority … [of FIFRA] to appear on the 
label or labeling is not prominently placed thereon”). 
 30. Id. § 136j(a)(1)(E).  
 31. Id. § 136v(b). 
 32. Id. § 136j(a)(2)(G). 
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FIFRA defines pesticide labels as “the written, printed, or graphic 
matter on, or attached to, the pesticide or device or any of its containers or 
wrappers.”33 Pesticide labels must specify “the name and percentage by 
weight of each active ingredient,” and “the total percentage of weight of all 
inactive ingredients.”34 Moreover, if the pesticide includes arsenic, the label 
must include “a statement of the percentages of total and water-soluble 
arsenic calculated as elemental arsenic.”35 
A pesticide’s label must include whether the pesticide is classified as 
restricted,36 its approved sites of application,37 the target pest of each site,38 
and the method of application including dilution.39 Labels must also include 
“[t]he frequency and timing of applications necessary to obtain effective 
results without causing unreasonable adverse effects on the environment”40 
and “[o]ther pertinent information which the Administrator determines to be 
necessary for the protection of man and the environment.”41 
Furthermore, EPA regulations provide standards for adequacy and 
clarity of directions.42 First, directions must be written so that the average 
person likely to use or supervise the use of the pesticide can understand 
them.43 Second, and more importantly, “when followed, directions must be 
adequate to protect the public from fraud and from personal injury and to 
prevent unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.”44 
B.  Federal and State Pesticide Applicator Certification 
Under the authority of FIFRA, EPA has imposed stringent 
requirements on pesticide applicator certification.45 States may also create 
certification programs so long that their regulations are at least as stringent 
as the EPA regulations.46 Importantly, these applicator certification 
 
 33. Id. § 136(p)(1). 
 34. 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(g)(1) (2010). 
 35. Id. § 156.10(g)(1). 
 36. Id. § 156.10(i)(2)(i). 
 37. Id. § 156.10(i)(2)(iii). 
 38. Id. § 156.10(i)(2)(iv). 
 39. Id. § 156.10(i)(2)(vi). 
 40. Id. § 156.10(i)(2)(vii). 
 41. Id. § 156.10(i)(2)(x)(F). 
 42. Id. § 156.10(i)(1)(i). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id.  
 45. 40 C.F.R. § 171 (2010). 
 46. Id.§ 171.7(e)(1)(i)(C). Since FIFRA’s preemption clause applies only to pesticide 
labeling, the statute does not preempt state applicator certification requirements. See 7 U.S.C. § 
136v(b) (2006) (preempting “additional or different” state labeling requirements). 
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requirements may help assert a duty of care in state tort claims.47 For the 
preemption question, the applicator certification requirements illustrate 
knowledge that may give rise to “additional or different” general standards 
of care and warnings than provided in EPA approved labeling.48 
FIFRA defines a “certified applicator” as any individual who is 
certified under the act to “use or supervise the use of any pesticide which is 
classified as restricted use.”49 An individual who applies a restricted use 
pesticide on property other than her own is a “commercial applicator,”50 
while an applicator who applies a restricted use pesticide on her own 
property is a “private applicator.”51A pesticide is considered applied under 
the supervision of a certified applicator, even if the certificated application 
is not present when the pesticide is applied.52 
EPA does not require private applicators to take a test establishing 
their competency to apply restricted use pesticides.53 However, commercial 
applicators are subject to more stringent requirements.54 Section 136i 
provides the EPA administrator can set certification requirements, which 
implicitly include a training program.55 Most importantly, EPA has 
authority to impose an examination requirement on commercial 
applicators.56 Section 136i permits states to submit a certification plan to 
the EPA for approval.57 In absence of an approved state plan, EPA takes 
responsibility for certification.58 
Pursuant to this authority, 40 C.F.R. § 171 delineates commercial 
applicator certification requirements. Competency is determined by 
 
 47. See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A (1965) (“Unless he represents that 
he has greater or less skill or knowledge, one who undertakes to render services in the practice of 
a profession or trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by 
members of that profession or trade in good standing in similar communities.”); id. § 288B(2) 
(“The unexcused violation of an enactment or regulation which is not so adopted may be relevant 
evidence bearing on the issue of negligent conduct.”); id. § 288C (“Compliance with a legislative 
enactment or an administrative regulation does not prevent a finding of negligence where a 
reasonable man would take additional precautions.”). 
 48. See 40 C.F.R. §171.4(b)(1)(ii) (2010) (providing that commercial applicators must know 
about pesticide application and dangers generally, in addition to label comprehension). 
 49. 7 U.S.C. § 136(e)(1) (2006). 
 50. Id. § 136(e)(3). 
 51. Id. § 136(e)(2). 
 52. Id. § 136(e)(4).  
 53. Id. § 136i(a)(1). 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. § 136i(a)(2). 
 58. Id. § 136i(a)(1). As of 2004, EPA had 1,081,803 certified applicators on file. 1987-2004 
Annual Certified Applicator Data, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/oppfead1/safety/applicators/data.htm 
(last visited August 24, 2011). 
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“examinations, and, as appropriate, performance testing.”59 All commercial 
applicators must prove competence in certain base-line standards,60 while 
different categories of commercial applicators also must prove competence 
in specific standards.61 
General areas of competency encompass label comprehension,62 
various safety factors,63 and application techniques.64 Commercial 
applicators must understand the format and terminology of pesticide 
labeling,” including “instructions, warnings, terms symbols, and other 
information appearing on pesticide labels.”65 They must also understand 
that the pesticide must be applied in a manner consistent to its label.66 
Required safety factors include “pesticide toxicity and hazard to man and 
common exposure routes,” “common types and causes of pesticide 
accidents,” and “precautions necessary to guard against injury to applicators 
and other individuals in or near treat areas.”67 Lastly, applicators must 
understand various procedures used to apply pesticides, along with which 
application techniques to use in a given situation.68 
Those applicators involved in “industrial, institutional, structural, and 
health related pest control” must understand pesticide formulations 
appropriate for various structural pests.69 They must also understand how to 
“avoid contamination of food, damage and contamination of habitat, and 
exposure of people and pets.”70 Furthermore, applicators must have a 
practical understanding of what factors lead to dangerous conditions, 
“including continuous exposure in the various situations encountered in this 
category.”71 
At their discretion, states may promulgate their own standards for 
commercial applicator certification.72 State standards must be at least equal 
to the standards promulgated by EPA under § 171.4(b).73 In Maryland, 
applicators must have one year prior experience working for an applicator 
 
 59. 40 C.F.R. §171.4(a) (2010). 
 60. Id. § 171.4(b). 
 61. Id. § 171.4(c). 
 62. Id. § 171.4(b)(1)(i). 
 63. Id. § 171.4(b)(1)(ii). 
 64. Id. § 171.4(b)(1)(vii). 
 65. Id. § 171.4(b)(1)(i). 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. § 171.4(b)(1)(ii). 
 68. Id. § 171.4(b)(1)(vii). 
 69. Id. § 171.4(c)(7). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. § 171.7. 
 73. Id. § 171.7(e)(1)(i)(C). 
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in the area in which she is seeking certification, obtain “a degree or 
academic certificate” approved by the Maryland Department of Agriculture, 
or accomplish a combination of both.74 Furthermore, applicants must score 
70 percent or higher on their exams to obtain certification.75 
II.  THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE 
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides:  
[t]his Constitution and the laws of the United States which 
shall be   made in Pursuance thereof; and all treaties made 
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
the Constitution or the Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.76 
In light of this language, Congress has authority to use its delegated 
powers to preempt state laws, even without conflict or invoking the 
Supremacy Clause.77 Nevertheless, courts assume “the historic police 
powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by [a] Federal Act unless 
[there is a] clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”78 Importantly, the 
federal preemption doctrine applies to both state statutes and common 
law.79 A state common law rule has the same preemptive effect as a state 
statute.80 
There are three modes of federal preemption. First, Congress may 
“supplant state authority in a particular field . . . [through express] terms of 
the statute.”81 Second, Congress may preempt an entire field by implication 
if “the scheme of federal regulation is ‘so pervasive as to make reasonable 
the inference that Congress left no room for States to supplement it,’”82 or 
where a Congressional enactment touches an area with a federal interest so 
dominant that it precludes state law.83 Third, Congress may preempt by 
 
 74. MD. CODE REGS. 15.05.01.08 (2010). 
 75. Id. 15.05.01.09. 
 76. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 77. Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual and Interpretive Issues, 
51 VAND. L. REV. 1149, 1155 (1998). 
 78. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 79. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (holding that state common law 
claims are preempted by federal statute). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 604–05 (1991). 
 82. Id. at 605 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 83. See Jordan, supra note 77, at 1165. 
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implication if “the state law actually conflicts with federal law,”84 such that 
the state law imposes an obstacle to accomplishing the objectives of 
Congress85 or complying with both the federal and state standards is a 
“physical impossibility.”86 While the Court recognizes that implied 
preemption can exist independently of a statute’s express preemption, it is 
not clear whether implied preemption should influence a court’s express 
preemption analysis.87 Lastly, important to administrative law issues, 
federal regulations are no less preemptive than federal statues.88  
III.  FIFRA PREEMPTION CASES: BUILDING UP TO BATES 
Congress passed FIFRA in 1947 to protect consumers from defective 
pesticides.89 However, due to burgeoning safety and environmental 
concerns, in 1972 Congress passed extensive amendments expanding 
FIFRA from a simple labeling law to an inclusive regulatory regime.90 
Through these amendments, Congress gave EPA authority to regulate the 
use, sale, and labeling of pesticides, as well as enforcement power.91 Most 
importantly, however, these amendments require that states not create any 
labeling requirements “in addition to or different from those required” 
under the statute and its regulations.92 With little guidance on this 
amendment, the Court began to interpret how this clause – and enhanced 
EPA authority under FIFRA – interacts with the broader preemption 
doctrine.93  
A.  Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier: State Positive Law 
In Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier,94 the Court considered 
whether FIFRA preempts local ordinances regulating pesticide use.95 The 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Mortier, 501 U.S. at 605 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 86. Id. (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 142–43 (1963)). 
 87. See Jordan, supra note 77, at 1164–65 (“[T]he Court's recent cases have sent a mixed 
message as to the extent to which the implied preemption doctrines should play a role in 
construing express preemption provisions. The cases suggest that the Court as a whole agrees that 
an express preemption provision does not foreclose consideration of the implied preemption 
doctrines. However, not all of the Justices are ready for a wholesale incorporation of the doctrines 
into a traditional express preemption analysis.”). 
 88. Fidelity Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153–54 (1982) 
(quoting U.S. v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)). 
 89. See Ian M. Hughes, supra note 28, at 315–16. 
 90. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences Inc., 544 U.S. 431, 437 (2005) (quoting Ruckelshaus v. 
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 991 (1994)). 
 91. Id. (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 991–92 (1994)). 
 92. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2006). 
 93. See infra SECTION III.A–C. 
 94. 501 U.S. 597 (1991).  
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Court held FIFRA does not expressly or impliedly preempt state or local 
level regulation of pesticides.96 The Court rejected the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court’s holding that § 136v and the provision’s legislative history 
evidenced Congress’ preemptive intent.97 The ordinance, enacted by the 
town of Casey, required a permit for pesticide application.98 Upon grant of 
a permit, the ordinance required the permittee to display signs notifying the 
public about the pesticide used and any labeling denoting a safe time to 
reenter the area.99 
The Court explained that § 136v(a) allows states to regulate the “use 
and sale of pesticides” because it did not evidence Congress’ intent to 
preempt local regulations.100 Reviewing the legislative history of the 
provision, the Court concluded that while there are some hints that 
Congress may have intended to preempt state regulations, the record fell 
short of showing a “clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”101 
Furthermore, the Court observed § 136v(b) would be surplusage if 
Congressional intent was to capture all pesticide regulation.102 Thus, the 
Court held that § 136v “plainly authorizes the ‘States’ to regulate pesticides 
and just as plainly is silent to local governments.”103 There was little 
evidence that FIFRA is a “comprehensive statute that occupied the field of 
pesticide regulation.”104 
B.  Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.: A Shift (and Split) in the Preemption 
Debate 
Despite the Court’s holding in Mortier, the FIFRA preemption debate 
shifted when the Court decided a case applicable specifically to labeling 
requirements.105 In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,106 the Court 
considered whether the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 
1965 preempted state common law requirements on cigarette labels.107 The 
 
 95. Id. at 600. 
 96. Id. at 606–08. 
 97. Id. at 607. 
 98. Id. at 602. 
 99. Id. at 603. 
 100. Id. at 610 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). If still 
current doctrine, this would suggest state common law rules imposing additional application 
techniques on applicators are never preempted. With Bates, however, this rule no longer stands.  
 101. Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 102. Id. at 613. 
 103. Id. at 607. 
 104. Id at 612. 
 105. See infra notes 106–19 and accompanying text. 
 106. 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
 107. Id. at 508. 
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preemption language of the statute reads, “[n]o requirement or prohibition 
based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect 
to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are 
[lawfully] labeled.”108 
The Court interpreted this provision as encompassing both positive 
state enactments and common law rules because the provision is broad and 
does not distinguish between positive state enactments and common law 
rules.109 Because the Court read the “requirement or prohibition” language 
to include common law rules, lower courts proceeded to interpret FIFRA’s 
“requirements” provision in a similarly broad fashion.110 However, courts 
disagreed over whether FIFRA expressly or impliedly preempted state 
common law claims.111 
For instance, the Eleventh Circuit concluded FIFRA expressly 
preempts state common law claims against manufactures.112 The court 
compared the requirements language of § 136v to the Cigarette Labeling 
Act.113 Taking Cipollone into account, the court found the requirement 
language does not manifest a Congressional intent to treat the preemption of 
common law and state statutes differently.114 Accordingly, all common law 
claims constituted requirements under the FIFRA provision and were 
preempted.115 
Contrary to the Eleventh Circuit, the Tenth Circuit found FIFRA 
impliedly preempts state common law claims against manufacturers.116 The 
court based its reasoning on a conflict between the two laws and field 
preemption.117 On the first point, the court reasoned that damages in state 
court founded on failure to warn claims do constitute “ad hoc 
determinations of the adequacy of statutory labeling standards,” hindering 
the purpose of §136v(b): ensuring uniform labeling standards.118 On the 
second point, the court reasoned that while the Supreme Court in Mortier 
found FIFRA does not preempt state application requirements, “Congress 
 
 108. Id. at 515 (quoting Pub. L. 91-222, § 5b, Apr. 1, 1970). 
 109. Id. at 521. 
 110. Joseph Frueh, Comment, Pesticides, Preemption, and the Return of Tort Protection, 23 
YALE J. REG. 299, 303 (2006). 
 111. See Hughes, supra note 28, at 325–30. 
 112. Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516, 517 (11th Cir. 1993). 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. at 518 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992)). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Arkansas-Platte & Gulf P'ship v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 959 F.2d 158, 164 (10th Cir. 
1992). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 162. 
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had impliedly preempted state regulation in the more narrow area of 
labeling.”119 
C.  Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, Inc.: The Parallel Requirements Standard 
In Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, Inc.,120 the Supreme Court clarified the 
FIFRA preemption doctrine – at least regarding manufactures – in favor of 
express preemption.121 In Bates, farmers sued Dow Agrosciences, Inc. 
(“Dow”) claiming that the company’s pesticide damaged their peanut 
crop.122 The pesticide’s EPA approved label stated that it should be used 
“in all areas where peanuts are grown.”123 The farmers claimed, however, 
that Dow knew or should have known that the pesticide would harm 
peanuts in soils over a 7-pH level.124 The farmers alleged strict liability, 
negligence, fraud, breach of warranty, and violation of the Texas DTPA.125 
After examining an “inducement” test applied by some courts,126 the 
Court held § 136v(b) expressly preempts state-law labeling and packing 
requirements “in addition to or different from” the labeling and packaging 
requirements approved by the EPA.127 According to the Court’s reading of 
the provision, there are two situations where state common law claims are 
not preempted.  
First, FIFRA preempts a state common law claim only if the claim 
directly imposes labeling requirements.128 For instance, FIFRA does not 
preempt rules requiring “manufacturers to design reasonably safe products, 
to use due care in conducting appropriate testing of their products, to 
market products free of manufacturing defects, and to honor their express 
warranties or other contractual commitments” because they have nothing to 
do with FIFRA pesticide labels.129  The mere fact that a state common law 
 
 119. Id. at 163 (emphasis in original). The court did not change its reasoning while considering 
the case on remand after the Supreme Court decided Cipollone. The court did not consider EPA 
regulations that require application standards on the labeling. Arkansas-Platte & Gulf P'ship v. 
Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir. 1993) (“We believe Congress 
circumscribed the area of labeling and packaging and preserved it only for federal law.”). 
 120. 544 U.S. 431 (2005). 
 121. Id. at 447. 
 122. Id. at 435. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 435–36. 
 126. Id. at 445–46. The “inducement” test was an effects-based test that presumed imposing 
liability upon pesticide manufactures would induce them to change their labeling. Id. at 445. The 
court critique this test, explaining it is “unquestionably overbroad because it would impeach many 
“genuine design defect claims.” Id. 
 127. Id. at 447. 
 128. Id. at 444. 
 129. Id. 
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claim of this kind may induce a pesticide manufacture to alter its label is 
immaterial.130 
Second, the Court held that certain state-law claims, such as failure-to-
warn, can impose labeling requirement if they claim the label included 
misleading or inadequate warnings.131 The court explained, however, that § 
136v(b) does not preempt these claims if the requirements and equivalent or 
consistent with the FIFRA misbranding provisions.132 Furthermore, state 
common law claims “need not explicitly incorporate FIFRA’s standards as 
an element of a cause of action in order to survive pre-emption.”133 
Importantly, the Court noted “[s]tate-law requirements must also be 
measured against any relevant EPA regulations that give content to 
FIFRA’s misbranding standards.”134 Thus, if an EPA regulation provides 
guidelines for labeling requirements, a state court cannot create a 
requirement inconsistent with the EPA guideline.135 To be sure, “a 
manufacturer should not be held liable under a state labeling requirement 
subject to § 136v(b) unless the manufacturer is also liable for misbranding 
as defined by FIFRA.”136 This language is relevant to claims against 
applicators because it connects a court imposed duty of care to EPA 
labeling regulations.137 Nonetheless, courts have generally failed to 
consider EPA regulations during FIFRA preemption analysis in applicator 
cases.138 
IV.  PESTICIDE APPLICATORS AND THE POST-BATES PREEMPTION DOCTRINE 
A.  Express Preemption: Stuck at “Step-One” 
Bates clarified express preemption under FIFRA, at least as applied to 
manufacturers.139 FIFRA preempts a state common law claim only if the 
claim directly imposes labeling requirement and it is in additional to or 
 
 130. See id. at 445 (“[The] effects-based test finds no support in the text of § 136v(b), which 
speaks only of ‘requirements.’”). 
 131. Id. at 446–47. 
 132. Id. at 447. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 453. 
 135. See id. (“For example, a failure-to-warn claim alleging that a given pesticide's label 
should have stated “DANGER” instead of the more subdued “CAUTION” would be pre-empted 
because it is inconsistent with 40 CFR § 156.64 (2004), which specifically assigns these warnings 
to particular classes of pesticides based on their toxicity.”). 
 136. Id. 
 137. See infra SECTION V. 
 138. See infra SECTION IV. 
 139. See supra SECTION III.C. 
BEUGELMANS - Vol 14 Website Final  
S-70 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY   [VOL. 14:Supp. 
different from EPA approved labeling.140 However, applying this parallel 
requirements test to common law claims against applicators is problematic 
because it is not immediately clear how those claims invoke EPA labeling. 
The express preemption debate thus centers on the first step of the Bates 
test: do common law claims against applicators impose labeling 
requirements at all? A survey of cases on the matter reveals three general 
approaches to the issue. First, some courts have found that imposing 
requirements on applicators in no way implicates FIFRA labeling 
requirements.141 Second, some courts have found FIFRA preempts claims 
against applicators in an almost blanket fashion.142 Third, some courts have 
found FIFRA preempts claims against applicators under more nuisance 
terms.143 Courts, including the one post-Bates federal district court to 
consider this issue, have generally not considered state common law claims 
against “any relevant EPA regulations that give content to FIFRA’s 
misbranding standards.”144 
1.  Preemption Not Possible: No Connection 
At least two courts have found FIFRA labeling requirements do not 
implicate claims against applicators.145 Nevertheless, these courts have 
reached the same result with different logic, focusing on a lack of an 
affirmative labeling requirement and the purpose of EPA labeling.146 
Neither court considered the content of EPA promulgated labeling 
regulations.147 
The Supreme Court of Indiana reasoned that, since FIFRA does not 
create an affirmative labeling requirement for applicators, it does not 
preempt any common law failure to warn claims against pesticide 
applicators.148 The court explained that while FIFRA does require pesticide 
manufactures to attach EPA-approved labels to their products in order to 
sell them, FIFRA does not require applicators to label anything.149 Thus, 
due to the lack of an affirmative labeling requirement on applicators, the 
court found the tort claim does not impose “a requirement additional to or 
different from those imposed by FIFRA.”150 Importantly, this presumption 
 
 140. See supra SECTION III.C. 
 141. See infra SECTION IV.A.1. 
 142. See infra SECTION IV.A.2. 
 143. See infra SECTION IV.A.3. 
 144. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences Inc., 544 U.S. 431, 447 (2005). 
 145. See infra notes 148–57 and accompanying text. 
 146. See infra notes 148–57 and accompanying text. 
 147. See infra notes 148–57 and accompanying text. 
 148. Dow Chem. Co. v. Ebling ex rel. Ebling, 753 N.E.2d 633, 639 (Ind. 2001). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
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against preemption applies independently of a common law claim’s 
differences with EPA approved labeling.151 
The Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion when finding a New 
York pesticide notification program was not preempted by FIFRA, but 
focused on the purpose of the labeling requirements rather than an 
affirmative duty to label the pesticide.152 A New York statute required 
applicators to provide their customers with a list of applied chemicals, the 
EPA’s approved label, and a cover sheet including additional warnings and 
safety information than provided on EPA labeling.153 
The court focused on the purpose of the two requirements. On one 
hand, FIFRA labeling “is designed to be read and followed by the end user. 
Generally, it is conceived as being attached to the immediate container of 
the product in such a way that it can be expected to remain affixed during 
the period of use.”154 On the other hand, the target audience of the state 
notification program are members of the public or individuals who 
contracted for pesticide application who enter areas where pesticides – 
often strong poisons – have been applied.155 Thus, the court reasoned, the 
state notification requirement does not impose additional requirements upon 
the EPA label because its purpose – warning the innocent public – dose not 
address the purpose of FIFRA labeling requirements: informing 
applicators.156 As a result, the court did not discuss the § 136v(b) 
prohibition against “additional or different” labeling requirements in 
relation to the New York law requirement that applicators provide 
additional safety information than on EPA labeling.157 
2.  Preemption Possible: No Explanation 
The majority of courts have found FIFRA can preempt claims against 
applicators, but do not explain why.158 Prior to Bates, many courts held 
FIFRA preempts common law claims against applicators in a seemingly 
blanket fashion and did not consider how tort claims against applicators 
 
 151. See id. (explaining that this theory draws from the lack of affirmative labeling 
requirements on pesticide applicators). Furthermore, the court did not find most applicator cases 
persuasive because they failed to consider this distinction. Id. 
 152. New York State Pesticide Coal., Inc. v. Jorling, 874 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 153. Id. at 116–17.  
 154. Id. at 119. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id.; 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2006). 
 158. According to my calculations, approximately 63 percent of the courts cited in this article 
found preemption but did not explain why.  
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interact with EPA labeling regulations.159 However, these cases may fall in 
line with a Cipollone-based notion that any mention of FIFRA labeling – 
even parroting EPA-approved labeling – automatically led to 
preemption.160 Even so, other courts completely skirted this issue under the 
theory that the plaintiffs’ claims merely involved a duty to warn of dangers 
printed on the label. Thus, under no formulation of the preemption doctrine 
could they impose additional or different requirements.161 
3.  Preemption Possible: Explained 
Some courts have found FIFRA can preempt claims against 
applicators and have explained their logic.162 However, their reasoning 
ranges from a lack of a duty to warn within EPA-approved pesticide 
labeling to an applicator’s reliance on the labeling.163 Furthermore, these 
cases give only a cursory reading (if any) to EPA promulgated labeling 
requirements.164 
One district court viewed the requirement of an affirmative duty to 
warn as imposing additional requirements upon EPA labels because EPA 
labels do not specify a duty to warn.165 As the court explained, “[t]he 
practical effect of permitting a jury to return a verdict against a defendant 
who has complied with the federal labeling requirements for violation of a 
 
 159. See Hottinger v. Trugreen Corp., 665 N.E.2d 593, 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (explaining 
the “broad prohibition imposed by FIFRA against state regulation of warning labels on hazardous 
substances bars common-law liability attempts to impose liability on top of that provided by 
federal laws” without explaining how the principle applies to pesticide applicators); King v. E.I. 
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 806 F.Supp. 1030, 1037 (D. Me. 1992) (finding that FIFRA preempts 
strict liability and negligence claims “for defective warnings or the failure to warn of the hazards 
associated with the products subject to regulation under the Act”); Tyler v. Dow Chem. Co. Inc., 
683 N.Y.S.2d 619, 620–22 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (explaining that FIFRA preempts common law 
claims against applicators, but not explaining its logic). 
 160. See Frueh, supra note 110, at 302–04. 
 161. Villari v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 568, 578 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (“Recognition of this 
‘failure-to-warn’ claim does not conflict with FIFRA's prohibition of state labeling or packaging 
requirements because the defendant's liability is unrelated to the manner in which the product is 
labeled or packaged. Under plaintiffs' theory, liability attaches as a result of defendant's failure to 
relay the warning that FIFRA requires sellers to affix to their product.”); see also Dow Chem. Co. 
v. Ebling ex rel. Ebling, 753 N.E.2d 633, 640 (Ind. 2001) (“We hold that FIFRA preemption does 
not apply to preclude the plaintiff’s action against … [the defendant] for its failure to warn the 
plaintiffs by providing them with the FDA-approved [sic] labeling information.”); Eyl v. Ciba-
Geigy Corp., 650 N.W.2d 744, 758 (Neb. 2002) (“[T]he applicators are simply being required in 
their use of the product to relay information to additional people.”); Pisano v. Budget Termite, No. 
551800, 2000 WL 226425 at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 10, 2000) (“Where the claim is merely 
failure to convey any warnings contained in the label then FIFRA is not implicated.”). 
 162. See infra notes 165–89 and accompanying text. 
 163. See infra notes 165–89 and accompanying text. 
 164. See infra notes 165–89 and accompanying text. 
 165. Watson v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17607 at *3 (D. Md. Nov. 8, 
1988). 
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common law duty to warn would be to require the defendant to provide 
warnings different than those required by the federal label.”166 This has 
broad reach, preempting any claim not based on an explicit warning 
requirement in the pesticide’s labeling. 
Another district court found FIFRA preempts common law claims 
against applicators based on the applicator’s reliance on the pesticide 
labeling.167 This case is of particular importance because it is the only post-
Bates court to decide this issue. In Morgan v. Powe Timber Company,168 
eighty-one plaintiffs sought damages for wrongful death and personal 
injuries they claimed resulted from the defendant’s treated wood product.169 
The defendants owned the treated wood processing facility and, in that 
capacity, applied pesticide to wood.170 The defendants, in their motion for 
summary judgment, claimed the FIFRA preempted plaintiff’s failure to 
warn claim.171 The plaintiffs, in response, claimed that “FIFRA preemption 
extends only to manufacturers, sellers and distributors of EPA-registered 
pesticides,”172 pointing to various cases where courts did not find FIFRA 
preempts claims that applicators failed to convey information printed on 
EPA approved labels.173 The plaintiffs also asserted that EPA approved 
labeling for the pesticides in question warned of skin and fume exposure.174 
After summarizing the holding of Bates,175 the court explained FIFRA 
preemption analysis focuses on whether the legal duty imposed creates a 
state law requirement to provide information in addition to or different from 
the label, rather than on whom the state law imposes the duty.176 
Connecting common law requirements on applicators to FIFRA labeling 
requirements, the court noted that FIFRA gives manufactures the duty to 
register its pesticides with EPA for approval.177 Importantly, applicators 
can rely to the same extent as distributors or sellers on the manufacturer’s 
labels because the labels have satisfied the rigorous label approval 
process.178 There is no need for applicators to research the accuracy of 
individual labels when they are in the worst position to access that 
 
 166. Id.  
 167. Morgan v. Powe Timber Company, 367 F.Supp.2d 1032 (S.D. Miss. 2005). 
 168. 367 F.Supp.2d 1032 (S.D. Miss. 2005). 
 169. Id. at 1034. 
 170. Id. at 1043. 
 171. Id. at 1041. 
 172. Id. at 1042–43. 
 173. Id. at 1043–44. 
 174. Id. at 1044. 
 175. Id. at 1041. 
 176. Id. at 1043. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. (quoting Taylor AG Industries v. Pure–Gro, 54 F.3d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
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information.179 Furthermore, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that 
applicator claims are not preempted, reasoning that all the claims cited by 
the plaintiff did not impose requirements in addition to or different from 
EPA imposed labeling requirements.180 
Having established that claims against applicators implicate labeling 
requirements, the court then moved to the defendant’s primary preemption 
argument.181 Namely, since the EPA approved label does not warn against 
burning wood treated by the pesticide, any common law requirement for 
failure to warn of such a danger – even upon applicators – would impose 
“addition or different” labeling requirements.182 In response, the plaintiff 
presented evidence that many EPA approved labels for the pesticide in 
question included warnings about skin absorption and even the dangers of 
exposure to fumes.183 Parsing this evidence, the court rejected the 
defendants’ claim that FIFRA preempted plaintiff’s failure to convey EPA-
approved handling instructions for chemically treated wood products.184 
According to the court, FIFRA does not preempt failure to convey claims 
regarding the contents of EPA approved labels; FIFRA, however, does 
preempt claims involving additional or different requirements than EPA 
approved labels.185 
While the court’s application of the basic Bates preemption doctrine is 
relatively straightforward,186 its connection between applicator common 
law claims and EPA labeling requirements is undeveloped.187 In fact, the 
court does not articulate how this EPA labeling regulations can invoke the 
FIFRA preemption provision.188 In SECTION V, this article contends Bates 
fully supports such a connection.189 
 
 
 
 
 179. Id. (quoting Taylor AG Industries v. Pure–Gro, 54 F.3d 555, 560–63 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
 180. Id. at 1043–44. 
 181. See infra notes 182–85 and accompanying text. 
 182. Id. at 1044. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 1045. 
 185. See id. (concluding that FIFRA never preempts failure  to convey claims, but not 
precluding the possibility that FIFRA preempts failure to warn claims imposing additional or 
different labeling requirements). 
 186. See id. (applying the Bates “additional or different” test). 
 187. See id. (finding that preemption is possible, but not discussing EPA labeling 
requirements).  
 188. See id. (discussing the possibility of preemption without analyzing how EPA labeling 
requirements interact with the FIFRA preemption provision). 
 189. See infra SECTION V. 
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B.  Implied Preemption: An Unworkable Defense 
It is possible, but extremely unlikely, that FIFRA preemption of claims 
against applicators exists independently of the express preemption regime 
established in Bates.190 The Supreme Court allows implied preemption 
claims even if an express preemption claim exists for another portion of a 
statute.191 Furthermore, while the Supreme Court held in Mortier that 
FIFRA does not impliedly preempt all state labeling requirements, it did not 
specifically address applicator claims.192 Thus, FIFRA can preempt 
common law claims against applicators under a theory of implied 
preemption, even if a court does not find FIFRA and EPA regulations 
adequately connect labeling requirements and the conduct of applicators.193 
However, as the discussion below reveals, it is very difficult or even 
impossible to raise an implied preemption defense under FIFRA. 
1.  Field Preemption 
a.  Pervasive Regulatory Scheme 
Congress may preempt an entire field by implication if “Congress 
intended the federal government to occupy [the field] exclusively.”194 
There is no exact measure for when a regulatory scheme is comprehensive 
enough to imply preemption.195 However, the Court has found implied 
preemption both where, in addition to an extensive regulatory scheme, 
federal interest in regulation is low.196 The Court has paid particular 
attention to the regulation of “minutiae” – whether the federal regulatory 
program is so pervasive that it regulates down to the most specific aspects 
 
 190. See infra notes 191–247 and accompanying text. 
 191. See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288–89 (1995) (allowing an implied 
preemption defense even though the requirements for a judicially established express preemption 
defense were not met).  
 192. See Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 611–12 (1991) (finding FIFRA 
does not broadly preempt state claims against applicators). 
 193. This is an ideal claim in jurisdictions that find “no connection” between applicators and 
labeling requirements. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Ebling ex rel. Ebling, 753 N.E.2d 633, 639 (Ind. 
2001) (noting the lack of an affirmative notification requirement on applicators); New York State 
Pesticide Coal, 874 F.2d at 119 (noting the difference of audience between pesticide labeling and 
general warnings to the public). 
 194. Jordan, supra note 77, at 1165. 
 195. Id. at 1168. 
 196. Compare Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 380 U.S. 685, 688-
890 (1965) (noting the pervasive features of a federal government regulatory program that 
arguably dealt with a strong federal interest – trade with Native Americans), with Cloverleaf 
Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 169 (1942) (noting the pervasive features of a federal 
government regulatory program in an area of low federal interest: butter regulation). 
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of the field.197 Nonetheless, the Court views pervasive administrative 
regulations with reluctance because agencies deal with issues in much 
greater detail than Congress, greatly increasing the likelihood of preemption 
under the non-administrative standard.198 
Focusing on this issue, the Indiana Supreme Court held FIFRA does 
not preempt claims against applicators via a pervasive regulatory 
scheme.199 It explained FIFRA allows states in some instances to regulate 
pesticides, noting the act provides ample room for States and localities to 
supplement federal regulatory efforts even without the express 
authorization of §136v(a).200 Relying on Mortier,201 the court reasoned that 
“like a state or local regulatory scheme that requires permits and notice to 
the non-user consumer/bystander and imposes penalties, the imposition of a 
duty to warn on applicators is not preempted by FIFRA.”202 
In the end, courts are simply reluctant to find implied preemption from 
the extent of administrative regulations.203 Since modern regulatory 
legislation is necessarily complex, with Congress not always intending such 
legislation to be preemptive, it is unlikely a court would view extensive 
FIFRA regulations as impliedly preempting common law claims against 
applicators.204  
 
 
 
 
 197. See Warren Trading Post, 380 U.S. at 688–90 (“The Commissioner has promulgated 
detailed regulations prescribing in the most minute fashion who may qualify to be a trader and 
how he shall be licensed; penalties for acting as a trader without a license; conditions under which 
government employees may trade with Indians; articles that cannot be sold to Indians; and 
conduct forbidden on a licensed trader's premises.”); Cloverleaf Butter, 315 U.S. at 168 (1942) 
(“By the statutes and regulations, the Department of Agriculture has authority to watch the 
consumer's interest throughout the process of manufacture and distribution. It sees to the 
sanitation of the factories in such minutiae as the clean hands of the employees and the 
elimination of objectionable odors, inspects the materials used, including air for aerating the oils 
and confiscates the finished product when materials which would be unwholesome if utilized are 
present after manufacture.”). 
 198. Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 717 
(1985). 
 199. Dow Chem. Co. v. Ebling ex rel. Ebling, 753 N.E.2d 633, 639-40 (Ind. 2001). 
 200. Id. at 640. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Hillsborough County, Fla., 471 U.S. at 717 (noting the Court’s skepticism towards the 
extent of administrative regulations in preemptions cases). 
 204. See New York State Dept. of Soc. Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 415 (1973) (“[T]he 
subjects of modern social and regulatory legislation often by their very nature require intricate and 
complex responses from the Congress, but without Congress necessarily intending its enactment 
as the exclusive means of meeting the problem.”).  
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b.  Dominant Federal Interest 
Congress may preempt an entire field where its enactment touches an 
area with a federal interest so dominant that it precludes state law.205 
Dominant federal interest field preemption requires an issue greater than a 
mere federal interest because almost every topic subject to Congressional 
action is a national issue.206 For instance, the Court has found a dominant 
federal interest in alien registration because of the national government’s 
traditional role in international affairs.207 Additionally, the Court balances 
federal and state interest by analyzing the history of state and federal 
regulation, as well as the regulatory scheme as a whole.208 
No courts, federal or state, have considered this type of preemption 
defense in a pesticide applicator case.209 Ironically, this defense may 
operate identically to a defense under FIFRA’s express preemption 
language.210 Commercial concerns suggest a dominant federal interest in 
regulating the contents of pesticide labels.211 The federal government 
working alone can impose uniform labeling requirements, while states 
operating separately would impose many different labeling requirements, 
unjustifiably burdening pesticide manufactures.212 State common law 
claims that require a different standard of care than on EPA-approved 
labeling disrupt this uniformity, implying EPA was abusing its discretion by 
requiring a specific standard of care on the product’s label to fulfill its 
labeling regulations.213 Thus, the dominant federal interest in uniform 
labeling requirements is implicated by imposing additional or different 
standards of care upon pesticide applicators.214 
 
 205. Jordan, supra note 77, at 1165. 
 206. Id. at 1166. 
 207. Hines v. Davidowitz, 323 U.S. 52, 62–63 (1941).  
 208. Jordan, supra note 77, at 1168. 
 209. However, courts have discussed the matter in regards to manufactures. See Ciba-Geigy 
Corp. v. Alter, 834 S.W.2d 136, 144 (Ark. 1992) (examining preemption of claims against 
manufactures and explaining that “[t]he adoption of Section 136v(a) demonstrates that the scheme 
created by FIFRA is not so pervasive or the federal interest so dominant as to demonstrate an 
intent to preempt state tort claims”). 
 210. See infra notes 211–219 and accompanying text (explaining how this theory operates, in 
the end imposing the same standard as FIFRA’s express preemption clause). 
 211. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, Inc., 544 U.S. 431, 452 (2005) (discussing the danger of 
multiple state labeling requirements). 
 212. Id. (“In the main, [§ 136v(b)] preempts competing state labeling standards—imagine 50 
different labeling regimes prescribing the color, font, size, and wording of warnings—that would 
create significant inefficacies for manufacturers.”). 
 213. This argument mirrors the argument for applicator preemption under Bates. See infra 
SECTION V.A. 
 214. For a full explanation of how EPA labeling regulations preempt claims against 
applicators, see infra SECTION V.A. 
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Similarly, a dominant federal interest may extend from the relative 
expertise of EPA in developing a standard of care for pesticide 
applicators.215 As Justice Breyer explains in his concurring opinion in 
Bates, “the federal agency charged with administering the statute is often 
better able than are courts to determine the extent to which state liability 
rules mirror or distort federal requirements.”216 Since EPA is a national 
agency charged with approving application standards included in pesticide 
labeling,217 it is in the best position to determine what conduct should be 
able to undergird a negligence claim, thus preempting state common law 
claims.218, However, FIFRA would not preempt common law claims 
mirroring EPA-approved standards of care because they do not implicate 
the federal interest in uniform labeling,219 
2.  Conflict Preemption 
As discussed earlier, Congress may preempt by implication if “state 
and federal law actually conflict,”220 such that the state law “stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and 
objectives of Congress”221 or complying with both the federal and state 
standards is a “physical impossibility.”222 Courts rarely struggle with the 
later point because such cases normally involve state laws that allow an act 
prohibited by federal law – a fairly obvious physical impossibility.223 
The former method of preemption, however, presents more of a 
challenge. In these instances, the courts must determine, based on how the 
law is applied rather than written, whether the State law presents an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’ objectives.224 Under this 
inquiry, while it may be possible for parties to comply with both a state and 
 
 215. See Bates, 554 U.S. at 455 (Breyer, J., concurring) (explaining EPA may be in the best 
position to address the extent to which FIFRA preempts state law). 
 216. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 217.  See infra SECTION I (outlining EPA’s authority under FIFRA). 
 218. See Bates, 554 U.S. at 455 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he federal agency charged with 
administering the statute is often better able than are courts to determine the extent to which state 
liability rules mirror or distort federal requirements.”). 
 219. In the end, this functionally mirrors the operative effect of Bates’ express preemption 
language. See infra SECTION V.A.  
 220. Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–143 (1963). 
 223. Jordan, supra note 77, at 1171. 
 224. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 323 
U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
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federal law, the state law conflicts with an essential federal purpose behind 
the regulation.225 
One district court explained that allowing common law claims against 
applicators does not frustrate what it determined is FIFRA’s underlying 
purpose: “that non-uniform requirements by states would burden interstate 
trade of pesticides.”226 Under this logic, successful plaintiffs would only 
encourage compliance with state pesticide use and sale regulations, rather 
than induce sellers to alter their labeling.227 Furthermore, the Indiana 
Supreme Court explained the purpose of FIFRA is not frustrated by 
requiring applicators to convey warnings because the requirement promotes 
rather than frustrates FIFRA’s objectives and does not burden applicator 
compliance with FIFRA..228 
It is important to note, however, that these two courts were considering 
failure to relay already established EPA labeling warnings, not additional or 
different warnings.229 Legislative history suggests Congress, via § 136v(b), 
directly aimed to preempt additional applicator requirements imposed by 
state pesticide programs existing at the time Congress passed FIFRA.230 As 
Representative Helstoski explained during floor debate, “[t]he preemption 
of State authority . . . seems to be clearly aimed at the heart of these strong 
State programs. If one examines the history of this bill as it moved through 
markup in committee, it seems apparent that this gutting of strong State 
programs is intentional.”231 He further explained that the preemption 
language was designed to prevent states from creating more tightly 
regulated pesticides that required the written approval of a “Pest 
Management Specialist” before use.232 This limitation was of particular 
concern because the House during markup had removed a provision for 
“use by permit only” pesticides applicable only by “Pest Management 
Specialists.”233 Thus, if the purpose of the FIFRA preemption language was 
specifically added to prohibit state requirements on applicators, then 
 
 225. See id. (holding a state flour weight labeling requirement preempted by federal law 
because, while it would have been possible to comply with both laws, doing so would conflict 
with a main purpose behind the federal law: uniform labeling for easy product comparison). 
 226. Villari v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 568, 578 (E.D. Pa. 1988). 
 227. Id. 
 228. Dow Chem. Co. v. Ebling ex rel. Ebling, 753 N.E.2d 633, 640 (Ind. 2001). 
 229. Id. (holing that FIFRA preemption does not apply instances where an applicator failed to 
provide a copy of the pesticide labeling); see Villari v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 568, 578 
(E.D. Pa. 1988) (noting that the plaintiff’s claim does not involve additional or different warnings 
than as contained in the label).  
 230. See 117 Cong. Rec. 40034 (1971) (discussing FIFRA’s preemptive intent regarding state 
pesticide programs). 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 40035. 
 233. Id. 
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additional state common law claims frustrate this purpose.  It is worth 
remembering, however, the considerable debate surrounding the 
authoritative strength of legislative history.234 
3.  Administrative Intent to Preempt 
If an agency intends its regulations to preempt state law and it acts 
within the scope of its delegated authority, it can impliedly preempt 
common law claims.235 More specifically, a court should not disturb an 
applicator’s choice if it is a reasonable accommodation of conflicting 
policies delegated to the agency, unless the statute or its legislative history 
evidence that the accommodation is not sanctioned by Congress.236 
Furthermore, the force of preemptive regulation is not contingent upon 
express congressional authorization to preempt state law.237 
The Federal Register reveals EPA promulgated many FIFRA labeling 
requirements in response to the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control 
Act of 1972,238 which changed the focus of pesticide regulation from 
labeling verification to public health and environmental concerns.239 EPA 
promulgated the labeling requirements with the intent that they would 
provide “restrictions appropriate to the nature and degree of hazard posed 
by a particular pesticide use.”240 Additionally, EPA designed the 
regulations to “assure that human health and the environment are not 
exposed to unreasonable risk”241 and “to improve the quality of labels in 
terms of communication to pesticide users by grouping required 
precautionary statements together.”242 Similar to the dominant federal 
interest argument,243 this may fall in with Justice Breyer’s reasoning that 
 
 234. See generally Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of 
Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427 (2005) (discussing the use of 
legislative history generally); Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being Ambiguous: Substantive 
Canons, Stare Decisis, and the Central Role of Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative 
State, 69 MD. L. REV. 791, 824-25 (2010) (discussing the use of legislative history as applied to 
administrative law). 
 235. Fidelity Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153–54 (1982). 
 236. United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961). 
 237. Fidelity Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 458 U.S. at 154. 
 238. 39 Fed. Reg. 36973 (Oct. 16, 1974). The notice of final rulemaking reveals EPA made 
few changes to the final rule, including the essential language currently at 40 C.F.R. § 
156.10(i)(1)(i) (directions for use). 40 Fed. Reg. 28242, 28252 (July 3, 1975). 
 239. Marina M. Lolley, Comment, Carcinogen Roulette: The Game Played Under Fifra, 49 
MD. L. REV. 975, 978 (1990). 
 240. 39 Fed. Reg. 36974 (Oct. 16, 1974). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. See infra SECTION IV.B.1.b. 
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EPA is in the best position to determine the appropriate standard of care for 
pesticide application.244 EPA may be exercising this authority. 
Nevertheless, EPA has not explicitly stated its intent to preempt state 
requirements.245 Furthermore, even if FIFRA does preempt state-level 
requirements on pesticide applicators, there is no indication of intent to 
preempt common law tort claims through depriving them of redress.246 
Other portions of FIFRA also complicate this claim, allowing states to 
create their own requirements for pesticide applicator certification, in effect 
creating greater standards of care for pesticide applicators.247 Taken as a 
whole, these considerations prove fatal to preemption through 
administrative intent. 
V.  PREEMPTION, ADMINISTRATIVE FEDERALISM, AND SOME SUGGESTIONS 
In his Bates concurrence, Justice Breyer emphasized the importance of 
EPA expertise in lieu of FIFRA’s preemption language.248 As Justice 
Breyer explained: 
 
the federal agency charged with administering the statute 
is often better able than are courts to determine the extent 
to which state liability rules mirror or distort federal 
requirements. Thus, the EPA may prove better able than 
are courts to determine whether general state tort liability 
rules simply help to expose new dangers associated with 
pesticides or instead bring about a counterproductive 
crazy-quilt of anti-misbranding requirements.249  
 
Because FIFRA may preempt certain common law claims against 
pesticide applicators, with EPA effectively creating a nationwide standard 
of care for pesticide application, EPA should take the preemptive effect of 
its regulations into account when promulgating future FIFRA labeling 
 
 244. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences Inc., 544 U.S. 431, 454-55 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 245. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 702 (1984) (finding the FCC 
determined the preemptive effect of its regulations on state level telecommunications regulations 
via express purpose). 
 246. See Hardin v. BASF Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43112, *9 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 15, 2005) 
(holding tort actions in pesticide drift claims are not preempted by FIFRA because the court was 
“without evidence that the EPA intended its regulations regarding spray drift to prohibit state law 
claims seeking compensation for property damage caused by off-target drift”). 
 247. See 40 C.F.R. § 171.7 (2010) (establishing standards for state certification programs). 
 248. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences Inc., 544 U.S. 431, 454-55 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 249. Id. at 455 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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regulations and approving new or altered pesticide labeling.250 With 
adequate safeguards, FIFRA preemption in applicator cases is an 
appropriate use of administrative expertise, aligning the scope of FIFRA 
preemption to the federalism concerns of the Bates Court.251 This section 
first describes how Bates opens the door for preemption of common law 
claims against pesticide applicators.252 It then outlines a few basic 
precautionary measures for EPA against unnecessary preemption, briefly 
considering administrative federalism issues.253  
A.  Preempting Claims Against Pesticide Applicators 
Bates lays the groundwork for preemption of certain state common law 
claims against pesticide applicators,254 although the decision affects general 
negligence and negligent failure to warn claims differently.255 In Bates, the 
Court noted § 136v pre-empts positive or common law rules that impose 
labeling requirements different than those provided in FIFRA and its 
regulations.256 To this end, courts must weigh state law requirements 
against “any relevant EPA regulations that give content to FIFRA’s 
misbranding standards.”257 As an example, “[a] failure-to-warn claim 
alleging that a given pesticide’s label should have stated ‘DANGER’ 
instead of the more subdued ‘CAUTION’ would be pre-empted because it 
is inconsistent with 40 CFR § 156.64 (2004), which specifically assigns 
these warnings to particular classes of pesticides based on their toxicity.”258 
Thus, the focus is not on what a state law specifically requires a label to  
 
 250. See Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 721 
(1985) (explaining that, as summarized by Justice Breyer in his Bates concurrence, agencies “can 
be expected to monitor, on a continuing basis, the effects on the federal program of local 
requirements”). 
 251. Bates does not recognize the pesticide market as more appropriate for the decentralized 
tort process than federal administrative control. While Bates does limit the extent of preemption, it 
only does so to the logical contours of EPA’s expertise. Indeed, while state tort does create a 
“counterbalance as the profit motive urges manufacturers to introduce new, potentially harmful 
products,” EPA control of such claims goes further by replacing judicial variability with 
administrative certainty. Furthermore, I disagree that state courts are an appropriate forum for 
pesticide manufactures and applicators to realize the “social costs” of their potentially deadly 
products. See Frueh, supra note 110, at 308–09 (explaining that pesticide tort claims are not 
suitable for wide-scale federal control and advocating market efficiency through the adjudication 
of injuries). 
 252. See infra SECTION V.A. 
 253. See infra SECTION V.B. 
 254. See infra notes 256–60 and accompanying text. 
 255. See infra notes 261–68 and accompanying text. 
 256. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences Inc., 544 U.S. 431, 452 (2005). 
 257. Id. at 453. 
 258. Id. 
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include.259 Instead, preemption arises whenever a state common law claim 
is additional to or different from what EPA required on the label to fulfill its 
labeling regulations.260 
Under this logic, FIFRA preempts general negligence claims in a 
relatively straightforward fashion. Pursuant to EPA regulations, the label, 
when followed, must be adequate to protect the public from personal 
injury.261 Therefore, if a state common law claim against an applicator 
holds she should have followed different conduct than the standard of care 
required on the label, the state court is creating a standard different than 
what EPA determined is required by its labeling regulations. In essence, 
EPA, pursuant to its regulations, has determined the label is sufficient to 
protect the public. The single, adequate standard of care for application of 
the pesticide must be on the label and EPA is charged with authority to 
determine this standard of application. State courts cannot impose a 
different standard of care because, pursuant to the EPA regulations, that 
standard should be included on the labeling.262  
Taking into account additional regulations, claims an applicator was 
negligent for applying a pesticide to a particular site263 or diluting the 
pesticide in a certain way264 are preempted by FIFRA if they are 
“additional or different” than what EPA determined satisfied the labeling 
regulations. In fact, since the label must include “[o]ther pertinent 
information which the Administrator determines to be necessary for the 
protection of man and the environment,”265 arguably any other standard of 
application apart from those listed on the label are preempted.  
Bates has a slightly different effect on negligent failure to warn claims. 
On one hand, the CFR does not impose an outright verbal warning, 
suggesting additional or different warnings cannot invoke EPA 
promulgated labeling requirements.266 Without an EPA promulgated 
regulation explicitly requiring specific warnings based on specific criteria, a 
common law duty to provide warnings in no way conflicts with EPA 
 
 259. See id. at 443 (noting the Court of Appeals correctly held “that the term ‘requirements’ in 
§ 136v(b) reaches beyond positive enactments, such as statutes and regulations, to embrace 
common-law duties.”). 
 260. See id. at 453 (explaining that “a state-law labeling requirement must in fact be equivalent 
to a requirement under FIFRA to survive-preemption”).  
 261. 40 C.F.R. 156.10(i)(1)(i) (2010). 
 262. See id. § 156.10(i)(1)(i) (“When followed, directions must be adequate to protect the 
public from fraud and from personal injury and to prevent unreasonable adverse effects on the 
environment.”). 
 263. Id. § 156.10(i)(2)(iii). 
 264. Id. § 156.10(i)(2)(vi). 
 265. Id. § 156.10(i)(2)(x)(F). 
 266. See generally id. § 156.10 (providing labeling requirements, but not providing an 
affirmative warning requirement). 
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standards.267 On the other hand, EPA labeling requirements use broad 
enough language that imposing additional or different warning 
requirements can fall within their authority. For instance, EPA can interpret 
the statutory provision that “directions must be adequate to protect the 
public . . . from personal injury” to require an affirmative warning upon 
application.268 Thus, the statute arguably preempts additional or different 
warning requirements.269 
B.  A Few Suggestions 
In the end, while Bates does extend preemption to claims against 
pesticide applicators in certain circumstances,270 EPA can limit the extent 
these regulations interfere with state regulation.271 At the same time, EPA 
can also ensure that commercial applicators are held a standard equal to that 
created by the federal and state certification requirements.272  
Administrative agencies have expertise in technical fields that courts 
do not.273 Furthermore, Congress often leaves broad discretion to 
administrative agencies, both purposefully and inadvertently, in order to 
administer a “statute in light of everyday realities.”274 Recognizing this 
role, courts typically afford administrative agencies wide latitude in 
technical determinations within their regulatory field.275 While there is 
considerable scholarly debate as to how much deference courts should 
afford agencies in the absence of an express preemption clause,276 FIFRA 
 
 267. See supra SECTION I.A (discussing EPA labeling regulations under FIFRA, none of which 
include an affirmative duty to warn). 
 268. 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(i)(1)(i). 
 269. Alarmingly, this theory means that a pesticide applicator can never be held liable for 
failure to warn unless EPA imposes an explicit requirement via its regulations. See supra notes 
266–68 and accompanying text. 
 270. See supra SECTION V.A. 
 271. See infra notes 297–308 and accompanying text. 
 272. See infra note 304 and accompanying text. 
 273. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864–66 (1984). 
 274. Id. at 865–66. 
 275. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 
(1983) (“When examining … [a] scientific determination, as opposed to simple findings of fact, a 
reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential.”); N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, 322 
U.S. 111, 130 (1944) (“In making [the NLRB’s] determinations as to the facts in these matters 
conclusive, if supported by evidence, Congress entrusted to it primarily the decision whether the 
evidence establishes the material facts. Hence in reviewing the Board's ultimate conclusions, it is 
not the court's function to substitute its own inferences of fact for the Board's, when the latter have 
support in the record.”). 
 276. See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 741–42 
(2004) (“Although the political accountability of agencies for considering state interests is not 
significantly inferior to that of Congress … Chevron deference to agency interpretations of the 
preemptive effect of statutes is nonetheless inappropriate.”). 
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includes such a clause.277 Bates dictates the scope of this clause,278 
allowing EPA to determine its preemptive effect.279 
While the outcome of administrative implied preemption cases rests 
more heavily on a judicial balancing act between federal and state interests, 
courts apply with express preemption.280 In these cases, “the outcome 
frequently turns on the resolution of statutory ambiguities such as whether 
state law can be said to ‘relate to’ a subject covered by federal law or to 
impose a ‘requirement’ or ‘standard’ subject to federal control.”281 This 
analysis “includes, at least implicitly, an evaluation of the real-world impact 
of state regulation on maintaining a national commercial market.”282 In 
Bates, the Court drew “a conceptual wedge between liability standards and 
remedies,”283 preempting liability standards inconsistent with those created 
by the EPA, but not preempting state created remedies. This may stem from 
the court’s general unwillingness to leave injured citizen without redress.284 
Still, the Bates Court did nothing to prevent what is, under the current 
EPA regulations, both a preemptive ceiling and floor. Preemptive floors 
create a federal baseline standard, with states able to create more stringent 
standards.285 FIFRA regulations create a preemptive floor by allowing 
states to promulgate certification requirements at least as stringent as EPA 
requirements.286 Alternatively, preemptive ceilings completely preclude 
more stringent state regulation, but allow less stringent state regulations.287 
 
 277. 7 U.S.C. § 136(v)(b) (2010). Even if Bates did not extend preemption to applicator 
claims, EPA could arguably extend the scope of FIFRA through an interpretive rule, entitling the 
agency to Chevron deference. See Mendelson, supra note 276, at 753 (noting “the agency might 
interpret the scope of an express preemption clause to, say, preempt state statutory law but not 
state tort law. The relevant agency interpretations are those eligible for Chevron deference – hence 
those reached in a rulemaking or formal adjudication”). 
 278. See supra SECTION  III.C. 
 279. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences Inc., 544 U.S. 431, 455 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(examining how the majority’s holding allows EPA to determine the preemptive effect of its 
regulations). 
 280. Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 744 
(2008).  
 281. Id.  
 282. Id.  
 283. Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 470 (2008).  
 284. Id. at 471 (“Viewed from [a] remedial vantage point, Bates seems to settle comfortably 
within a wider pattern in the Court's general unwillingness, in the products liability realm, to leave 
injured citizens without any remedy whatsoever.”). 
 285. William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling 
Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1558 (2007). 
 286. See 40 C.F.R. § 171.7(e)(1)(i)(C) (2010) (“[State commercial application requirements] 
shall conform and be at least equal to those prescribed in § 171.4 for the various categories of 
applicators utilized by the State.”). 
 287. Buzbee, supra note 285, at 1558. 
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Through its “additional or different” preemption language, FIFRA operates 
as a preemptive ceiling by preventing states from imposing more stringent 
standards for pesticide labeling and application.288 FIFRA also operates as 
a preemptive floor by preventing less stringent standards.289 These types of 
preemption regimes typically benefit target industries.290 However, 
preemptive ceilings may threaten the federal system.291 To be sure, the 
“new unitary federal choice preemption . . . threatens to displace completely 
state and local legal developments and the benefits of intersystemic 
interaction inherent in federalist schemes.”292  
This dual floor and ceiling means that plaintiffs injured by pesticides 
may be without redress afforded by a jury verdict. Since EPA applicator 
certification standards require that applicators understand “precautions 
necessary to guard against injury to applicators and other individuals in or 
near treatment areas,”293 commercial applicators are required to have the 
capacity to follow a standard of care higher than included on pesticide 
labeling.294 Nevertheless, while “[t]he state-law requirement need not be 
phrased in the identical language of its corresponding FIFRA 
requirement,”295 a plaintiff who seeks to hold an applicator to a higher 
standard of care than required by a pesticide’s label may find herself unable 
to receive compensation.296  
One way to prevent this sort of unnecessary preemption is through 
label-by-label analysis. EPA can scrutinize labels for unjust preemptive 
effects.297 Through adopting a new procedural rule, it can attempt to 
provide the most comprehensive list of proper application techniques 
possible, making it less likely that a plaintiff may try to impose a 
requirement that is not offered on the label. While EPA must already 
determine that its labeling when followed is adequate to protect the public 
 
 288. See supra SECTION  III.C (examining the holding of Bates preempting additional or 
different state labeling requirements, including implicitly more stringent standards). 
 289. Id.  
 290. Buzbee, supra note 285, at 1590 
 291. Buzbee, supra note 285, at 1556. 
 292. Id. 
 293. 40 C.F.R. §171.4(b)(1)(ii)(c) (2010). 
 294. See, e.g., Johnson v. County Arena, Inc., 349 A.2d 643, 645–46 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1976) (explaining that individuals engaged in a profession must “observe precautionary rules 
established by competent authority to guard against accidents and prevent injuries to others.”). 
 295. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences Inc., 544 U.S. 431, 454 (2005) 
 296. See supra SECTION V.A. 
 297. EPA labeling regulations include similar ambiguous requirements, necessitating the 
agency to adhere to general policy goals rather than merely require certain warnings under a set 
list of criteria. C.f. 40 C.F.R. §156.10(i)(1)(i) (2010) (providing labels “must be adequate to 
protect the public from fraud and from personal injury and to prevent unreasonable adverse effects 
on the environment.”). 
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from personal injury,298 adding an explicit requirement that the 
administrator consider the labeling’s preemptive effect may protect against 
unintentional omissions that, ultimately, would preempt a plaintiff’s worthy 
claim. 
However, this type of case-by-case analysis may be inappropriate for 
EPA because “[t]he decision to displace [state law] is a multifaceted, high-
stakes discretionary policy judgment that requires considerable 
sophistication if it is to be exercised properly.”299 Since, “it is a fair 
question whether any legal institution is up to the task,”300 EPA arguably 
does not have the institutional competence to undergo federalism analysis at 
the same time as science-based label certification and changing political 
influence.301 However, a simple change to pesticide labeling can at least 
partially address these concerns. 
Since designing federal regulatory regimes to rely on state 
administration may be more effective than judicial intervention at 
incorporating federalism concerns into agency decisionmaking,”302 EPA 
should require all pesticide labels include a requirement that commercial 
applicators apply the pesticide in a manner consistent with EPA or state 
promulgated certification standards.303 This scheme would be advantageous 
in a number of ways. First, it would hold pesticide applicators to a standard 
commensurate with their training, not the potentially lower standard 
included in EPA approved labeling.304 Second, it would remove the federal 
preemptive ceiling in regards to pesticide applicators, allowing states to 
create their own, more stringent standards for applicators.305 Third, since 
 
 298. 40 C.F.R. 156.10(i)(1)(i) (2010). 
 299. Merrill, supra note 280, at 744. 
 300. Id.  
 301. Id. at 755–66 (“[A]gencies know little about constitutional law and usually disclaim any 
authority to opine on questions like the scope of the commerce power or other constitutional 
provisions bearing on the division of authority between the federal government and the states. 
Agencies may also pose a greater threat to stability in the division of authority, given that they are 
prone to policy shifts with changes in administration and can act to implement policy shifts much 
more quickly than Congress or the courts. In terms of balance, transferring preemption authority 
to agencies would increase the capacity of the legal system to displace state law, which would 
probably result in a further shift in the direction of more federal authority.”). 
 302. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law As the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2071 
(2008). 
 303. See 40 C.F.R. § 171 (2010) (providing commercial applicator certification guidelines). 
 304. However, this would also make it more difficult for applicators to determine if they are 
committing an unlawful act because the price application standards will not longer be printed on 
the pesticide labeling. See 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(G) (2006) (providing it is unlawful for a person 
“to use any registered pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling”). 
 305. For commercial applicators, this would remove FIFRA’s preemptive ceiling, leaving only 
the preemptive floor created by EPA commercial applicator certification regulations. This would 
address the federal concerns discussed earlier in this subsection. See 40 C.F.R. § 171.7(e)(1)(i)(C) 
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EPA must approve state certification requirements, such a regulation would 
promote communication between federal and state authorities. Rather than 
completely displacing developments at the state and local level, this would 
promote federal and state collaboration and perhaps better promote state 
interests.306 Fourth, it would maintain the Bates Court’s requirement that 
EPA misbranding requirements control jury verdicts. Upon a defendant’s 
request, a trial court would  “instruct the jury on the relevant FIFRA 
misbranding standards, as well as any regulations that add content to those 
standards,”307 including implicitly the EPA or state commercial applicator 
certification requirements. The standard of care would no longer be limited 
to the labeling, encompassing the entire curriculum required for commercial 
applicator certification.308 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
State and federal courts have generally failed to consider EPA labeling 
regulations in their preemption analysis in pesticide applicator cases.309 
This has left courts divided, often reaching contradictory results based on 
fuzzy logic.310 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences reshapes this analysis, holding 
that EPA regulations preempt claims against both applicators and 
manufactures if they are additional or different than EPA approved 
labeling.311 Bates requires courts to consider EPA misbranding 
requirements, preempting claims against commercial applicators that 
require a different standard of care than included on EPA approved labeling 
to comply with EPA labeling regulations.312 Based in part on federalism 
concerns, EPA should limit the far reaching effect of  this decision.313 On 
all pesticide labeling, EPA should require commercial applicators apply the 
pesticide in a manner consistent with the training necessitated for state or 
federal commercial applicator certification.314 
 
 
(2010) (State commercial application requirements "[s]hall conform and be at least equal to those 
prescribed in § 171.4 for the various categories of applicators utilized by the State.”). 
 306. Unlike an ordinary preemption regime, this rule would promote communication between 
federal and state administrative authorities, effectively circumventing a perceived limitation of 
federal preemption. See Buzbee, supra note 285, at 1556 (warning that unitary federal choice 
preemption “threatens to displace completely state and local legal developments and the benefits 
of intersystemic interaction inherent in federalist schemes”). 
 307. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences Inc., 544 U.S. 431, 454 (2005). 
 308. See 40 C.F.R. § 171 (2010) (providing commercial applicator certification guidelines). 
 309. See supra SECTION IV. 
 310. See supra SECTION IV. 
 311. See supra SECTION III.C. 
 312. See supra SECTION V.A. 
 313. See supra SECTION V.B. 
 314. See supra SECTION V.B. 
